pwaLUPMIS2/dist/.htaccess
ekke 664c242980 Apache hardening: block .git and .env disclosure
Preventive, not incident-driven. No LUPMIS host is known to have been
compromised; these rules exist so the most common automated attack against a
PHP deployment cannot succeed.

Scanners probe every public host for /.env (database passwords, API keys) and
/.git/. The second is the more damaging: given /.git/index together with
/.git/objects an attacker can reconstruct the whole repository, including its
history — so any credential ever committed is exposed even after rotation.
That is directly relevant here, because the minio-uploads integration has had
access keys written into its PHP files and those files are tracked in Gitea.

- public/.htaccess: deny hidden paths and files that should never be served.
- docs/apache-hardening.conf: the same rules for vhost/server config, which is
  where they belong — .htaccess depends on AllowOverride. Also covers logging
  the real client address through the openresty proxy (mod_remoteip), and
  blocking at the proxy so requests never reach the application.

Two details that are easy to get wrong, and are handled:

- <FilesMatch "^\."> does NOT stop /.git/config. FilesMatch tests the basename
  only, and there the basename is "config". Blocking a hidden directory needs a
  rule that sees the whole path: mod_rewrite in .htaccess, <DirectoryMatch> in
  server config.
- The SPA fallback only rewrites paths that do not exist (!-f), so a real .env
  on disk skips it and is served as a plain file. The deny rules therefore run
  before the fallback, not after.

.well-known is exempt, or ACME certificate renewal would silently break.

Verified against a live Apache instance with a planted .env and .git tree:
/.env and /./.env return 403; /.git/config, /.git/HEAD, /.git/objects/... and
/backup.sql return 404; /.well-known/acme-challenge/..., /assets/*.js and
/manifest.json still return 200. Nothing in the document root is caught — the
only dotfile there is .htaccess, which Apache never serves.

These rules are damage limitation. The fix is to keep .git and .env out of a
document root: deploy build output rather than a working copy, and hold secrets
in environment variables outside the served tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 12:53:20 +02:00

97 lines
4.5 KiB
ApacheConf

# ============================================================================
# LUPMIS2 PWA — Apache config
# ============================================================================
# Apache's default DirectoryIndex order serves index.html before index.php.
# We need the opposite so the SSO-aware index.php gets a chance to run first,
# inject session data into the page, and then return the index.html content.
DirectoryIndex index.php index.html
# Make sure .php files are executed (defensive — usually enabled site-wide,
# but explicit here in case the deployment dropped this association).
<FilesMatch "\.php$">
SetHandler application/x-httpd-php
</FilesMatch>
# Second line of defence for hidden FILES (.env, .htpasswd, …), in case
# mod_rewrite is not loaded. This does not cover hidden directories such as
# /.git/config — see the mod_rewrite block below, which does.
# Both Apache 2.4 and 2.2 syntaxes are given so this works either way.
#
# Access control runs before mod_rewrite, so a hidden file answers 403 here
# while a hidden directory answers 404 from the rewrite below. Both refuse to
# serve the content, which is the point; the differing codes are cosmetic.
<FilesMatch "^\.">
<IfModule mod_authz_core.c>
Require all denied
</IfModule>
<IfModule !mod_authz_core.c>
Order allow,deny
Deny from all
</IfModule>
</FilesMatch>
<IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
RewriteEngine On
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Block hidden paths (.git, .env, .svn, …) — MUST stay first
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Scanners routinely fetch /.env and /.git/config, and if /.git/index
# plus /.git/objects/… can be read the whole repository — including its
# history and any credential ever committed — can be reconstructed.
#
# Two things make this easy to get wrong:
#
# 1. <FilesMatch "^\."> does NOT stop /.git/config. FilesMatch tests
# the basename only, and the basename there is "config". Blocking a
# hidden *directory* needs a rule that sees the whole path, which in
# .htaccess means mod_rewrite (<DirectoryMatch> is server-config only).
#
# 2. The SPA fallback further down only rewrites paths that do NOT
# exist (!-f / !-d). A real .env on disk therefore skips the
# fallback and gets served as a plain file. So this rule has to come
# before it, not after.
#
# .well-known is deliberately exempt: blocking it breaks Let's Encrypt
# (ACME) certificate issuance and renewal.
#
# 404 rather than 403, so a probe learns nothing about what exists.
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} !^/\.well-known/
RewriteRule (^|/)\. - [R=404,L]
# Files that are never meant to be fetched over HTTP, if one is ever
# deployed into the document root by mistake.
RewriteRule \.(sql|sqlite|sqlite3|db|bak|backup|old|orig|save|swp|log|ini|conf|key|pem|crt|p12|pfx)$ - [R=404,L,NC]
RewriteRule (^|/)(composer\.(json|lock)|package(-lock)?\.json|yarn\.lock|Dockerfile|docker-compose\.ya?ml|\.dockerignore)$ - [R=404,L,NC]
# Clean URL for the iframe embed endpoint: /embed → embed.php
# Must come BEFORE the SPA fallback so /embed doesn't get routed to
# index.php. Query strings (?mode=permit&...) pass through automatically.
RewriteRule ^embed/?$ embed.php [L]
# Common single-page-app behaviour: if a route doesn't map to a real file
# or directory, send the request to index.php so the PWA can handle it
# client-side. Comment out this block if hash-based routing is preferred.
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-d
RewriteRule ^ index.php [L]
</IfModule>
# Iframe-policy override for the embed endpoint. Some Apache deployments set
# `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` as a default security header for every
# response — that prevents `permits.lupmis4luspa.org` from framing
# `pwa.lupmis4luspa.org/embed`, even though our Content-Security-Policy
# `frame-ancestors` directive explicitly allows it. Safari prefers
# `X-Frame-Options` when both are present, so we have to remove it.
#
# We unset it ONLY for embed.php (so index.php still inherits the
# site-wide SAMEORIGIN protection against clickjacking). embed.php's own
# `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors` header (set in PHP) is then
# the sole iframe-policy header and permits the configured embedder.
<IfModule mod_headers.c>
<Files "embed.php">
Header always unset X-Frame-Options
</Files>
</IfModule>